

4 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Herbert E. Hetu
Director of Public Affairs

SUBJECT: DCI Notes

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1. Action Requested: That you approve the attached item (Tab A) for the next edition of the Notes from the Director.

2. Background: The proposed item is a candidate suggested recently by the Director of Security and endorsed by the DDA. It will complement the announcements of the Alcohol Program coordinator and the NIO/Warning, and the lead article on Channels for Dissent, all of which you have already approved (Tab B).


3. Recommendation: That you approve the item on Compartmentation to be published immediately along with those previously approved.

Herbert E. Hetu


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Attachments a/s

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APPROVAL: 
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 10 OCT 1978

DISAPPROVAL: 
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE:

ZERO-BASED REVIEW OF COMPARTMENTED APPROVALS

At my direction, the Office of Security recently completed a zero-based review of compartmented approvals as held by one Agency contractor and one Agency component. Under the methodology of such a review, each and every compartmented approval must be rejustified or cancelled. As I suspected it would, our pilot study reflected that a significant percentage of the individuals concerned had no current valid need for such approvals. These people, accordingly, have been debriefed. While I recognize that such zero-based reviews involve significant effort on the part of the Office of Security, the Agency components involved, and contractors, it is my intention that they become a long-range and structured aspect of our security program and that they be carried out not only in the Agency but throughout the Intelligence Community.

CHANNELS FOR DISSENT

The principal method for the expression of dissent within the Agency involves the various avenues available within each Directorate for challenging or testing analysis, policy and procedure. This is a process which must take place in a routine yet vigorous fashion if our products and activities are to be maintained at a level of high quality. The squelching of divergent views on significant issues can lead to intellectual stagnation and second-rate performance. It is important, therefore, that employees be made to feel that presentation of well-reasoned dissenting views on significant substantive issues in the normal course of their work is not only tolerated but is welcomed by enlightened line managers. It is also important that each Directorate publicize its philosophy on dissent, as well as its methods for processing it.

There are occasions when employees may feel that valid views on matters of particular significance have not received adequate consideration by line management. In such cases, an employee may believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that the Director or Deputy Director should be informed of divergent opinion which could have an important impact on significant analytical, operational, or managerial issues. The Deputy Director and I encourage the submission of such dissenting views directly to us in writing and have asked [REDACTED] SA/DCI, to make certain that such

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papers are given expeditious handling and made available promptly.

It is important that dissent not be confused with personal grievances or complaints, for which a different procedure exists. While dissent can be defined as an expression of significant substantive opinion at variance with formally accepted positions within the Agency on analytical, operational, or managerial matters, a grievance is a request by an employee for relief from dissatisfaction with career matters, working conditions or burdensome administrative decisions which affect the employee personally.

While there may be special circumstances in which a dissent should be registered confidentially, the real value of dissent lies in the open airing of an issue and the intellectual debate it stimulates within a Directorate.

Dissent should, of course, be confined to matters within the Agency's field of competence and authority. While there may be foreign policy decisions, for example, with which some of our people disagree, this Agency does not make foreign policy. It would therefore be neither profitable to use our forums to air such disagreements nor appropriate to encourage dissent on matters which are the proper province of other agencies or departments.

Employees are assured that submissions of dissent will be seriously reviewed and responded to appropriately. The Deputy Director and I consider dissent by employees to be expressions of legitimate and healthy concern for the achievement of superior performance by this Agency. It can play a vital role in maintaining the intellectual integrity and validity of Agency products and practices.

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Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000300060017-8

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NIO FOR WARNING

One of the major reasons why this Agency and my office were created was the determination of the Executive and of Congress that this country not have another Pearl Harbor. Obviously, strategic warning must be my highest priority. Every one of us in fact, no matter what his job, is responsible in some way for ensuring that the nation never again suffers a surprise attack. No less important is warning in the broader sense -- warning of any development serious enough to concern the President and the National Security Council.

It is apparent that we need a stronger national structure for warning than that which now exists. I have therefore asked [REDACTED] to step aside from his position as Associate Director of NFAC to devote himself exclusively to establishing new national warning procedures as a matter of highest priority. I am establishing for him a special position as National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

In this capacity as NIO/Warning, he will be my senior staff officer for all warning matters. On the policy and management side, he will chair an interagency "Warning Working Group," and will serve as Executive Secretary of an NFIB-level warning committee chaired by the DDCI. On the substantive side, that is, in deciding of what to warn and when to do it, he will work through and direct the other National Intelligence Officers, among whom he will be first among equals. He will also be my "ombudsman for warning" in the Community, available, should anyone believe a serious threat is being overlooked, to listen and if necessary to take action in my name.

In the establishment of new warning procedures and disciplines, we will be asking many of you to give greater attention to warning matters. This will not be just another bureaucratic exercise; it is a serious effort to meet a critical requirement. The NIO/Warning will have my strong personal backing.

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Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000300060017-8

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